Yuki Tsunoda made headlines in sprint qualifying at the United States Grand Prix, not because of a spectacular lap but because of a timing failure that denied him the chance to start his closing lap. Red Bull publicly apologised through team boss Laurent Mekies, but the truth is more complex. This incident exposes both an operational problem within Red Bull and obvious shortcomings in Tsunoda's own performance.
Where did things really go wrong?
The problem started as early as SQ1. Tsunoda set just one flying lap and finished 18th. On that first attempt, he was 1.119 seconds behind teammate Max Verstappen. That pace deficit was not a one-off; in free practice, his speed on the soft tyres was also disappointing. On the mandatory mediums in SQ1, the same deficit appeared to apply. A tailwind at Turn 1 and the hairpin cost time, and the fact that Tsunoda was still driving with an old front wing played a part - although he himself indicated that it would not make the biggest difference.
Strategically, Red Bull then made a decision that increased the risk: Tsunoda went back into the pits instead of staying outside. Fuelling made his stop last about two minutes and eight seconds, after which he had to wait in a long line of cars. While some drivers stayed outside - including Verstappen, the Mercedes drivers, McLaren and Alpine's Pierre Gasly and Charles Leclerc - Red Bull opted for the garage plan. That choice proved fatal. As the group of cars approached the start line, the chequered flag was waved; Tsunoda was one of the drivers (along with Ollie Bearman, Esteban Ocon and Gabriel Bortoleto) who were prevented from starting a final flying lap as a result.
Mekies' excuse and team responsibility
Mekies openly admitted: 'We messed up, our apologies to Yuki.' The technical explanation was that the schedule was too tight and Red Bull misjudged who could still get on the track in time. The fact is that the operational timing failed. The departure from the pit lane was rushed and after 93 seconds between garage exit and entering the track, Tsunoda was fifth in a line with nothing to start. That is a process error; in sprint qualifying, where every second counts, this simply has to be better.
What Tsunoda himself could have done
Yet Red Bull was not the only culprit. Had Tsunoda been closer to Verstappen on his first attempt, he would have made SQ2 and this whole scenario would have been avoided. His weakness on the soft and medium tyres made the team decide to partially compensate with refuelling and a pit stop. Had he performed more convincingly in the practice sessions, full refuelling for the full session would have been a more logical choice. His radio comments 'it's going to be tight' and 'I'm not sure we're going to make it' show that he too felt the risks, but did not have the margin to change them.
The wider lesson for sprint qualification and for Red Bull
This incident shows two things. First, sprint qualification amplifies the impact of operational errors. The tyre-by-segment rule and compact schedules make strategic choices inexorable. Second, Red Bull needs to manage timing and decision protocols more tightly internally. A public apology letter is correct, but structural adjustments in pit strategy and exit timing are necessary.
Ultimately, this is a shared responsibility. Red Bull failed in execution. Tsunoda failed to deliver a safety lap on his first attempt. The sum of those failings resulted in a blowout for the Japanese, while Verstappen later showed that the car had the pace to keep going - and eventually took pole. For Red Bull and Tsunoda, progress now revolves around clearer procedures, tighter preparation for short sessions and reducing the margin for error on tyres and setup.
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